








































































































































































































































Abstract In this paper I show that central bank ﬂexibility may not be desirable
when it encourages trade unions to behave more aggressively. The argument is based
on a model where risk averse trade unions interact with a central bank. A ﬂexible
central bank stabilizes economic shocks and reduces output volatility. This enables
trade unions to realize higher real wages without risking the unemployment of some
insider workers. Risk averse insiders demand higher real wages, generate more in-
ﬂation and more unemployment. The overall egect on welfare may be negative. A
conservative central bank instead increases output and employment on average but
raises output volatility. The argument also sheds new light on the issue of optimum
currency areas. Wage claims are lower and employment is higher in a currency union
if national trade unions expect the central bank to do less to secure employment of
insider workers in their country.
Keywords: central bank ﬂexibility, central bank credibility, optimum currency
area.




In a well known paper, Rogog has argued that there exists a fundamental trade
og between credibility and ﬂexibility of monetary policy. When a government dele-
gates monetary policy to a credible anti-inﬂation central bank then it sacriﬁces the
ﬂexibility of the central bank to stabilize macroeconomic shocks. A credible central
bank therefore comes at the cost of more economic ﬂuctuations. Rogog’s suggestion
is that a government should institute an intermediate central bank which is more con-
servative than the government itself but not fully conservative. Such a central bank
provides some - but not complete - price stability and reduced economic ﬂuctuations.
In the present paper I argue that central bank ﬂexibility need not always be
desirable. I study the role of ﬂexible central banks in a setup with unionized wage-
setting. Trade unions are assumed to care for the employed insiders and to neglect
the interests of the currently unemployed, the outsiders. Moreover, trade unions
are assumed to be risk averse in the following sense: they want to avoid additional
unemployment because this would hurt some of the current insiders. A conservative
central banker exposes unions to more employment risk and thus induces them to
make less aggressive wage claims. This raises employment on average and leads to
lower inﬂation.
The argument is based on a model that studies the strategic interaction between
the trade unions and the central bank. In the model economic shocks may occur
after wages have been set. Monetary policy may react to these shocks. A central
bank that accommodates economic shocks generates little uncertainty about future
employment levels. From the point of view of a risk-averse trade union this is very
desirable. Central bank ﬂexibility enables trade unions to realize high real wages
without risking the unemployment of insider workers. If instead the central bank
does not accommodate macroeconomic shocks then the trade union fully takes the
risk of unemployment into account. It will therefore target a lower increase of the	
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real wage. Consequently there will be less unemployment on average.
When designing institutions from monetary policy the government still faces a
trade og between low inﬂation and reduced economic ﬂuctuations. However, the
reduction of economic ﬂuctuations comes at a higher cost. Flexibility enables the
central bank to reduce the volatility of output. However, the average level of output
and the rate of inﬂation are adversely agected by ﬂexibility. It may therefore be
desirable to delegate monetary policy to a fully conservative central banker.
The model adds a new argument to the recent discussion of the role of common
currency areas with unionized wage setting. Recent theoretical work by Gr¨ uner and
Hefeker and Cukierman and Lippi suggests that the introduction of a common cur-
rency area may lead to low levels of employment and higher inﬂation when trade
unions care less about the macroeconomic consequences of their actions. This raises
wage claims, unemployment and inﬂation. Accordingly, larger currency areas should
provide poorer macroeconomic results.
In the present setup this result is reversed. With an autonomous national mon-
e t a r yp o l i c yt h ec e n t r a lb a n ki sl i k e l yt oa c c o m m o d a t eap a r to fn a t i o n a le c o n o m i c
shocks. In a common currency area national trade unions instead expect the central
bank to do less to stabilize their national shock. This increases their exposure to
employment risk and makes them behave less aggressively. Consequently real wages
and unemployment will be lower in the participating countries then with autonomous
monetary policy. The beneﬁt of national monetary autonomy therefore only lies in
the reduction of economic ﬂuctuations. On the other hand, there is a positive level
egect from monetary uniﬁcation on output and inﬂation. The same holds for the




In a seminal paper Rogog (1985) has argued that there is a fundamental trade og
between monetary policy credibility and ﬂexibility. When the government decides on
the design of monetary policy institutions it may institute a credible anti-inﬂation
central bank in order to avoid an inﬂation bias. However, such a central bank does not
react ﬂexibly and appropriately to economic shocks. According to Rogog’s analysis a
government should institute an intermediate central bank which is more conservative
than the government itself but not fully conservative. Following Rogog’s contribution
many papers have addressed this fundamental trade og between credibility and ﬂex-
ibility and have suggested digerent solutions (among others Walsh, 1995, Lohmann,
1994, Fratianni, von Hagen and Waller, 1993, and Persson and Tabellini, 1993).
In this paper I argue that central bank ﬂexibility may actually not be desirable at
all. Central bank ﬂexibility reduces the trade unions’ risk of excessive unemployment
and encourages them to behave more aggressively. The argument is based on a
model which explicitly analyzes the strategic interaction between the central bank
and trade unions. Central bank ﬂexibility enables trade unions to realize higher real
wages without risking the unemployment of some insider workers. Risk averse insiders
will demand higher real wages, generate more inﬂation and more unemployment.
The overall egect on welfare may be negative. A conservative central bank instead
increases output and employment on average but raises output volatility.
In my model many trade unions interact with a single central bank. The unions are
interested in high real wages. Moreover, insiders on the labor market are interested in
being re-employed. The trade union is assumed to be risk averse. This means that it
does not want to risk that some of its members become unemployed. Macroeconomic
shocks may adversely agect employment. A trade union which is risk adverse will
therefore be reluctant to excessively raise nominal wages because it may risk the	
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unemployment of some of the insiders. From the point of view of the trade union it
will therefore be desirable to have a central bank which accommodates macroeconomic
shocks. If the central bank does not accommodate macroeconomic shocks then the
trade union fully takes the risk of unemployment into account. It will therefore target
a lower increase of the real wage. Consequently there will be less unemployment on
average.
When designing institutions from monetary policy the government still faces a
trade og between credibility and ﬂexibility. However, ﬂexibility comes at a higher cost.
Flexibility enables the central bank to reduce the volatility of output. However, the
average level of output and the rate of inﬂation are adversely agected by ﬂexibility. It
may therefore be desirable to delegate monetary policy to a fully conservative central
banker.1 A conservative central banker exposes unions to more employment risk and
thus induces them to make less aggressive wage claims.
This argument also opens a new perspective on the discussion about the optimal
size of a currency area and the egects of a common currency area on employment
(Calmfors, 1998a,b, Gr¨ uner and Hefeker, 1999 and Cukierman and Lippi, 2001).
Gr¨ uner and Hefeker and Cukierman and Lippi have argued that wage setters in a
currency union internalize adverse macroeconomic egects of wage claims to a lesser
extent. This raises wage claims, unemployment and inﬂation. In the present setup
this result is reversed. With an autonomous national monetary policy the central
1The present paper is related to the paper by Sorensen (1991). Sorensen has shown that a
monetary authority with unknown preferences may reduce wage claims of an economy wide trade
union. The union anticipates that higher wages will induce more variance of inﬂation. It should
be noted that this eect becomes less important when wage negotiations are decentralized because
individual unions matter less in the central bank’s reaction. In the present paper the degree of
centralization of wage negotiations does not play a role because unions only care about the way in
which the economy wide shock aects their employment.	
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bank is likely to stabilize a part of national economic shocks. In a common currency
area national trade unions instead expect the central bank to do less to stabilize
their national shock. This increases their exposure to employment risk and makes
them behave less aggressively. Consequently real wages and unemployment will be
lower in the participating countries then with autonomous monetary policy. The
beneﬁt of national monetary autonomy therefore only lies in the reduction of economic
ﬂuctuations. There is a positive level egect from monetary uniﬁcation on output and
inﬂation.
The present paper is related to a recent literature that revisits Rogog’s classical
argument. In particular Calmfors (1998b) and Jordahl and Las´ een (2000) study the
impact of less central bank ﬂexibility on labor market reform. They argue that gov-
ernments may be willing to pay the political cost of labor market reform when the
central bank is less reluctant to stabilize employment. The present paper instead ar-
gues that the labor market itself will react to a more restrictive central bank behavior.
Another interesting argument is provided by Lippi (1999). He provides an alternative
microfounded model of the interaction between wage setters and a central bank. In
his model imperfect competition among sectors leads to an externality that arises
from higher wage claims. Non-atomistic wage setters know that their increased wage
claims may lower the real wage in other competing sectors via additional inﬂation.
In addition it softens the impact of wage claims on output. Lippi shows that - if the
second egect dominates the ﬁrst - a more conservative central bank may lead to more
wage discipline and more employment in equilibrium.	
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2T h e M o d e l
2.1 Timing and Labor Demand
Consider the interaction of n sectoral trade unions and one central bank. Labor
unions ﬁx their wage simultaneously at stage one. At stage two the central bank
observes an economy wide shock a and at stage three it unilaterally ﬁxes inﬂation Z.





(1 + k(Z  wi + a)), (1)
where wi and Z are the logs of the sectoral wage and the price level respectively. The
variable a is an economy wide supply shock with mean zero and support [a0,a 00]w h e r e












is the economy’s average nominal wage. Unemployed workers receive a real wage
which is normalized to zero in absolute terms. Total unemployment is given by
u =1 l = k(w  Z  a). (4)
2.2 Preferences
The workforce is divided into employed insiders and the unemployed. The number of









For simplicity, it is assumed to be the same for all unions. Trade unions are assumed
to maximize utility of the employed workers. This assumption is in the tradition
of the insider-outsider theory (see Lindbeck and Snower, 2002, for a recent survey).
It either represents a situation where unemployed workers leave the trade union or
where the median voter in the trade union is an employed insider.
I assume that trade unions are inﬁnitely risk averse in the sense that they maximize
the minimum real wage that an insider can realize. This assumption makes the formal
analysis very convenient because unions maximize the minimum of wi Z subject to
the constraint that there is no risk of unemployment of current insiders.2 Hence unions
pick a wage such that, even with the worst possible economic shock re-employment
o ft h ei n s i d e r si sg u a r a n t e e d .





where A is a measure of the governments inﬂation aversion. The government delegates




The weight B can be chosen by the government. Note that the government and
the central bank want employment to be above the current level which is given by
uW =1 nlW
i > 0. The reason is that trade unions are willing to trade og some
employment against higher real wages.
I assume that the central bank can not commit to a particular inﬂation rate.




We can now solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game. The central bank
reaction to wage claims w can be derived by maximizing
C (Z,u)=BZ
2  k




2 (Z  w + a)=0 / (9)
Z =
k2




B + k2, (11)
we get
Z = b(w  a). (12)
The equilibrium policy of a single trade union is characterized by a nominal wage
such that for the maximum adverse shock a = a0 current employment is guaranteed.




where li = 1
n (1 + k(Z  wi + a0)) and Z = b(w  a0). This yields:
1
n
(1 + k(b(w  a


































Solving for the symmetric equilibrium wage yields:
w =





















where uW =1 nlW
i is total initial unemployment. Accordingly, equilibrium wage
claims are lower if the maximum adverse shock is larger and if more insiders are
employed initially.
3R e s u l t s
This leads us to the following ﬁrst result on the role of central bank ﬂexibility.
Proposition 1 A more ﬂexible central bank (lower B)i n c r e a s e s( i )n o m i n a lw a g e
claims and (ii) average unemployment.
Proof (i) Obvious.
(ii) Average unemployment is





Note that a0 < 0. Hence the derivative with respect to b is positive. Q.E.D.
The impact of ﬂexibility on inﬂation is also undesirable if the maximum shock is
not too large.3
3Note that for a large maximum shock the trade union would ﬁx wages such that more than full
employment obtains. Given the central bank’s loss function the reaction wuld be to deﬂate in order	
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Proposition 2 A more ﬂexible central bank increases average inﬂation if ka0 <u W.
Proof Expected inﬂation is given by:
























This condition holds for all b 5 [0,1] if ka0 <u W.Q.E.D.
The overall egect of ﬂexibility on welfare depends upon the variance of the shock.
If it is not too large then the negative impact on average inﬂation and employment
dominates the negative egect from less stabilization.
Proposition 3 Assume that ka0 <u W. A more ﬂexible central bank reduces welfare
if j2
















































to reduce emloyment. We concentrate on the case where unions have no such incentive to raise
employment above full employment.	
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The ﬁrst two terms represent the costs of average inﬂation and average unemploy-
ment. From Proposition 1 and 2 we know that both strictly increase in b if ka0 >l W
i.
The last term represents costs of volatility of inﬂation and employment. These costs
are decreasing in b for small values of b. The derivative with respect to b is ﬁnite.
Hence, for a suciently small variance j2
a the overall egect of more ﬂexibility on
welfare is negative. Q.E.D.
4R o b u s t n e s s
In this section I brieﬂy discuss the robustness of the main result when trade unions
are less than fully risk-averse. Consider for simplicity a single trade union with a von
Neumann Morgenstern utility function
v(/)=/. (29)
Note that this utility function describes a risk averse trade union since / is the
logarithm of the real wage. Denote the log of the real wage if unemployed by /0.T h e
variable a is an economy wide supply shock. It is distributed uniformly on [a0,a 0]
where a0 > 0.
Denote by
d =( 1 b)a (30)
the residual real wage shock after monetary policy intervention.
For each nominal wage we may calculate an expected real wage E/ =( 1 b)w.
For each such E/ there is an expected fraction (E/)o ft h ei n s i d e r sw h ow i l lb e	
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unemployed. Given the ﬁnite support of d there is a value E/W below which (E/)=
0. This value is given by
E/
W = d
0 = (1  b)a
0. (31)
Moreover, the function (E/) is strictly increasing in E/ for d0 <E / <d 0.
Expected union utility is
Ev =( 1 (E/))
Z
/dµ(/,E/)+(E/)/0, (32)
where µ(/,E/) is the distribution of / conditional on E/.
Obviously, the unions’ expected utility is strictly increasing in E/ if E/ <E /W.
This is so because all insiders remain employed with certainty for all E/ <E /W.
Whether or not expected utility it is further increasing for E/ >E /W depends upon
the value of /0. If this value is suciently low then expected union utility is decreasing
for E/ >E /W. In such a situation the union chooses the expected real wage E/ =
E/W = (1  b)a0. A more ﬂexible central bank therefore leads to a higher expected
real wage and more unemployment. Hence the main result is robust, if (i) being
unemployed is suciently undesirable for workers and (ii) the support of the shock is
ﬁnite.
5 Optimum currency areas
The argument developed so far sheds new light on the issue of the optimal size of a
currency area. The conventional wisdom of the corresponding literature is that there
is a trade og between reduced transaction costs and the reduced ability to stabilize
idiosyncratic shocks. Recently, Gr¨ uner and Hefeker (1999) and Cukierman and Lippi
(2001) have made an additional argument in favor of smaller currency areas. They
considered the impact of the size of the currency area on the behavior of wage setters.	
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According to their analysis a larger currency area may lead to less discipline of wage
setters when they internalize the inﬂationary consequences of their behavior to a lesser
extend.
In the present framework this last argument is reversed. To see why consider a
s e t u pw i t ht w oc o u n t r i e s ,e a c hw i t has i n g l et r a d eu n i o n . I ne a c hc o u n t r yj =1 ,2
there is an idiosyncratic output shock aj distributed uniformly on [a0,a 0]. Suppose
that a national central bank reacts according to
Zj = b(wj  aj). (33)
The part of the shock a which is not stabilized by the central bank is (1  b)aj.
Note that the maximum residual shock that may hit the economy in country j is
therefore d = (1  b)a0. A common central bank instead chooses an inﬂation rate









With a common central bank the maximum residual shock in country j is larger
then in the case of national monetary authority. To see why, consider a situation
where country 1 is hit by an adverse shock a1 = a0 while country 1 is hit by a
positive shock a2 = a0. There is no stabilization egort by the common central bank
which means that d = a1 = a0 fully hits economy 1. This reduces the national
trade unions’ ability to realize a high real wage without risking the unemployment of
insiders.
National trade unions know that a common central bank will do less to stabilize
national shocks. This increases the need for wage discipline if national employment
is to be secured. Consequently, a common national monetary policy combines the
virtues of low transaction costs with low unemployment and inﬂation.	
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6C o n c l u s i o n
The present paper provides an additional argument why central bank ﬂexibility may
lead to poor macroeconomic results. Monetary policy ﬂexibility may have some im-
portant negative egects when wage setters are risk averse. A ﬂexible central reduces
employment risk for insiders and induces them to behave more aggressively. This in-
creases unemployment and inﬂation. When the variance of macroeconomic shocks is
not too large the government should delegate monetary policy to a fully conservative
central bank. Note that wage setters would instead desire monetary policy to be fully
ﬂexible. This enables them to pick the desired point on their labor demand curve
without risking any additional unemployment.
Interestingly the degree of centralization of the wage setting process does not play
a role in the present analysis. Even with atomistic wage setting, the described egect
remains intact. In a number of other papers decentralization instead plays a major
role (Skott, 1997, Cukierman and Lippi, 1999 and 2001, Lippi 1999, or Gr¨ uner and
Hefeker, 1999). In those papers trade unions internalize their impact on monetary
policy to a lesser extend if wage setting is decentralized. In the present analysis
instead no such externality is important. Instead trade unions simply care about the
extend of residual uncertainty which they consider as given.
The present argument sheds new light on the issue of optimum currency areas.
With idiosyncratic shocks and unionized wage setting larger currency areas may in-
crease employment and reduce inﬂation if unions are risk-averse. This result is in
stark contrast to the negative results in Skott (1997), Gr¨ uner and Hefeker (1999),
Cukierman and Lippi (2001), and Gr¨ uner (1999). Further investigations into the
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